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FREEDOM AND

Symposia about issues of the "here and now" are rather like collections of
graffiti: Although the authors think their words particularly challenging and
relevant-not to say clever-at the time, subsequent readers are apt to find
them merely tiresome.2 Portions of the work under review suffer from this
infirmity. But the book does examine, however imperfectly, issues about student
freedom which recent events have shown to be far from resolved.3 The book
consists of four essays on student freedom by social critic Paul Goodman, 4
philosophy professor and university administrator John Searle,5 law professor
and due process theologian Sanford Kadish,0 and academic freedom historian
Walter Metzger.7 Mortimer Kadish, a philosophy professor at Western Reserve
University, where the symposium was held, has written a reflective conclusion
which is easily the best essay in the volume. 8 The editor, philosophy professor
Samuel Gorovitz, has contributed an introduction which is by turns stilted and
fatuous.9
The suggested solutions to the problem of student freedom range wide.
Goodman, expressing the "anarchist" view, wants to give students total freedom,
as "freedom" is defined in the anarchist hypothesis, stated thus: "In any behavior, force and grace and discrimination can occur only when the organism
is spontaneously initiating its own behavior, by some intrinsic motivation."' 0
In the world at large, Goodman defines freedom as liberation from all con1

Professor of Philosophy, Western Reserve University.
21 have often thought that Plato's Symposium hit a high point and that it has been
downhill ever since.
3 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 248 A.C.A. 1015, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463
(1967) ; Greene v. Howard Univ., No. 21,268 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 8, 1967) (per Bazelon, C.J. and
Wright, J.), granting student plaintiffs an injunction pending appeal from Civil No. 1949-67
(D.C.C., fied Aug. 28, 1967) (per Holtzoff, J.). The latter case arose out of a confrontation

between militant Negro students at Howard and a rather conservative administration. The
administration expelled the students without a hearing. The court of appeals, by the order
cited above, has ordered the students reenrolled pending decision on the merits of their first
amendment and due process claims. The author, among others, served as counsel to the
students in the district court and in the court of appeals.
4 FRFxoM AND ORDER In TnE Umznmsr 31-41 (S. Gorovitz ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited
as FRvom AND ORDE].
oId. at 89-103.
Old. at 127-40. See S. Kadish, Methodology and Criteriain Due Process AdjudicationA Survey and Criticism, 66 YAM L.J. 319 (1957).
7 F En
x AND ORDER 59-78.
8 Id.at 159-77.
9Id. at 1-27. The book also reprints the AAUP and ACLU statements on student
academic freedom, id. at 181, 191. The bibliography, id. at 207, is useful but not as discerning as that in Symposium-Student Rights and Campus Rules, 54 CAMn. L. Rxv. 1, 175
(1966). The book's bibliography does not even mention the Symposium, which has been
referred to as "outstanding" by at least one court. Goldberg v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
248 A.C.A. 1015, 1023 n.8., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 469 n.8 (1967).
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straints by others, that is, the theoretical ability to do what one wants. He
apparently conceives of freedom in the academic community as an absence of
organized course content, grading, and administration. 1
Sanford Kadish replies to this essay by denying one of Goodman's major
premises, namely that authority's right to dictate to all of us rests upon a
claim of rightness or truthfulness. According to Kadish, restraints are not only
self-evidently necessary to "make men free," but their content may be prescribed without having to make disputed claims about "truth."' 2 If he is right,
then much lawful authority is value-free and its power over our lives is not
subject to Goodman's objection that authority makes "right and wrong" judgments which it is no more competent to make than the rest of us.
Kadish's answer is not only wrong in itself, however; it fails to meet Goodman's central thesis. Of course some values concerning the organization of
human society have endured long enough to appear necessary to societal existence. The prohibition against taking the life of another is one. But when we
contemplate the various ways of classifying homicides as punishable or not,
as murder, manslaughter or otherwise, we see that Kadish cannot so easily
assume the rightness of any particular system of restraint from the propriety
of its objective.
The tendency to answer Goodman by missing his point is visible at other
points in Kadish's reply. For example, in answer to Goodman's generalized
attack on grading, Kadish asserts that it would be impossible to abolish grading at the University of California at Berkeley, as presently constituted. 13
Again, Kadish smuggles in his conclusion by artful statement of his premise.
In this case, having assumed the necessity of maintaining the present system
of education at the University of California, he shows how Goodman's proposal
would disrupt that system.
No, Goodman must be subjected to a broader attack, one directed at his
hopelessly utopian view of freedom and of the structure of the University. This
view proceeds from his definition of freedom as the elimination of all restraints.
Although Goodman is willing to concede that we must tell three year old children not to run into the street and even forcibly prevent them from doing so,14
he refuses to generalize from this isolated concession. He must refuse, for to
generalize would be to admit that what we want to do at any given time is the
product of knowledge that is socially determined. And the more of this socially
determined knowledge (like "don't run into the street") we have, the better
able we are to deal with the world as it is. In other words, humans maximize
their choices and their adaptive behavior by increasing their knowledge. Though
the acquisition of this knowledge puts one under certain constraints of the
kind Goodman is complaining about, it opens the way to a freedom which is
far more important to social living than Goodman's brand of freedom.' 5 The
prerequisites to freedom are also socially determined. For example, the method
by which goods and services are distributed plays a central role in determining
how free we are, and that method rests in turn upon our technology and upon
11Id. at 31-41. This

compact essay is well worth reading all the way through.
12 FEDom AND ORDER 42.
13 Id. at 45-46.
14Id. at 31-32.
15
See A. ScHA, A P=Losopxv or MAx 68-74 (1963).

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:236

our organization of men and method into the system of production."0 Thus, we
cannot resolve complaints about lack of freedom by behaving as though we are
unconstrained; rather, we must organize attacks upon aspects of the social
system which produce inequities.
Our dependence upon one another and upon the form of our society is
reflected in the organization of our universities. Goodman wants to reduce the
university to its simplest element-teachers and students who are free to work
out the content of their studies without interference. His idyllic vision of the
academic community is, of course, the product of his own thought, unperturbed
by the realization that we live in midtwentieth century America. In the real
world universities generally exist, and justify their existence to their financial
backers, because they prepare people to live and work in the world as it is.
Granted, graduates and professors project ideas out into the community, and
tension between thinking and doing at the bar of reality produces marginal
progress. By and large, however, the content of a university experience is
structured by the existing needs and values of contemporary America. At the
most elementary level, graduates, professors, and alumni expect that people
with degrees will fill one of the available jobs. Goodman's universities, by contrast, would either be places where radicals are trained to fight for different
ways of doing things-in which case these universities, necessarily few in number, could not make a substantial impact upon the system of higher education
as a whole-or places where a kind of intellectualized navel-gazing is carried
on by people as impatient and out of touch with the world as Goodman is.
Goodman is right about one thing, however: Today's universities are rather
repressive institutions.1 7 It is at first glance refreshing therefore, to encounter
the "maximalist", view of freedom on the campus espoused by another of the
essayists, John Searle.18 Searle's vision is far narrower than Goodman's for he
refers almost entirely to student political freedom, more specifically to the
issues about political freedom raised by Berkeley's Free Speech Movement.
At the time Searle wrote his essay, in November 1965, these problems required
explication, and the free speech theories which Searle propounds were much
in need of defense.
Subsequent events, however, have shown Searle's major premise to require
reexamination: That premise is that the university's principal functions-defined
by Searle as teaching and research-are inherently worth protecting, and that
rules about the time, place and manner of public speech on campus can be
sufficiently neutral in character to avoid controversy between an administration and a student body, both of whom desire to adjust their differences. This
assumption, which lay at the foundation of the detente achieved by the Free
Speech Movement and the Berkeley administration, has proven false.
For Searle, the meaning of "time, place, and manner" is related to his view
that the "normal" functions of the university are self-evidently worth protect1

6 This is not a novel insight. Aeschylus, for example, makes much the same observation
through the character Prometheus. AEscxus, PROMETHEUS BouND lines 505-82 (E. B.
Browning transl. 1952). See also G. THowsoN, Arsc=-us AND ATHENS 305-07 (3d ed. 1966).
17See Tigar, Book Review, 4 LAW n; TnANs. Q. 163 (1967). A recent statistical study
reveals the enormous lack of freedom on our campuses. Tm AMziucAN STUmDET's FREEDoM
oF ExpissIo: A REsEARcH APnsAs (J.Cowan & E. Williamson eds. 1966).
18
Fitmom AwD ORDER 92.
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ing. It should have been obvious that they are not and that there will continue
to be controversy over which functions are to be regarded as "normal" and
who is to make that determination. Because the ultimate question is "Who
runs the university?," it was utopian to assunie that free speech problems could
be isolated and solved by adoption of the "time, place, and manner" formula.
The formula fails because Searle's definition of "teaching" and "research" refers
to a system of instruction whose content and organization are largely governed
by the university administration. The "times" and the "places" for studentgenerated political and other activity are those left over after the administration has used all the times and places it needs for programs which it devises.
The problem thus created cannot be solved wholly within the framework
of constitutional analysis. The first amendment may be held to require only
that the administration refrain from restricting the freedom of effective speech;
this duty can be honored by insuring maximum freedom in areas suitable for
communication between speakers and hearers.' 9 A broader inquiry is needed.
I suggest that for the purpose of allocating facilities teaching and research
must at times give way to student-generated activities. After all, teaching and
research are not sacrosanct. Academic freedom does not demand, for example,
that a professor of anthropology who embraces the teachings of Genesis not as
mere sacerdotal whizbang 20 but as literally true be given tenure and turned
loose on sophomores. Similarly, the merits of university involvement in biological warfare research, or CIA projects, or hydrogen bomb manufacture, are
open to serious debate. And if the administration will concede, as it must, that
it makes tacit or express judgments about the "rightness" or "wrongness" of
what is taught or researched when it allocates facilities, there is no reason not
21
to include students in this decisionmaking process.
To return to the framework of Searle's paper, we can see that "teaching"
and "research" are not terms which end analysis concerning the use of university facilities. On the contrary, they call into play myriad judgments about
facts and values. Thus, Searle's "maximalist" theory solves only questions on
the edge of the controversy and may have the effect of insulating the heart
of the university-its decisionmaking structure-from student demands for
participation.
I suggest that allowing students to participate meaningfully in running
universities is the wisest course which an administration can take. We are
witnessing today the bankruptcy of many traditional institutions and the abdication by their leaders of responsibility for the problems of poverty, war, pollution
of the environment, and the other ills of contemporary America. An increasing
proportion of our youth perceive this failing. The preservation of a university
19

Citation of authority seems absurd here. See generally, R. M. O'Neil,
the Academic Senate Resolution, 54 CA=r. L. REv. 88 (1966); Comment, The
the Public: The Right of Access by Nonstudents ta 'University Property, 54
132, 147-73 (1966). The latter is about the best student work on free speech
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20 The phrase is recalled from somewhere in the works of H. L. Mencken.
211 have tried elsewhere to derive this conclusion from administrative rule making
premises. M. Tigar, Student Participation in Academic Governance, March 1966 (mimeo
prepared for 1966 Association of Higher Education Conference, abstracted in 1966 Current
Issues in Higher Education 169).
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system which uses traditional modes of transmitting traditional wisdom is
absurd, for those modes reflect the values and institutions which time and
the tide of events have shown to be bankrupt. University administrators do
not, I am sure, lack the will to end the malady. But they must apply to themselves the words of Herzen, "We are not the doctors, we are the disease," 22
and give to others the task of building a university suited to the task of social
change.
My critique of Searle is not intended to adumbrate a bold new day for
student freedom but to suggest that Searle's vision is too limited and that
at this stage students must seek reallocation of power within the university.
If they do so, they will quickly meet enemies, in the person of trustees, regents,
governors, former child actors, and just plain citizens, as well as a phalanx
of on-campus vested interests. Despite its limited prospect of success, the fight
for a new deal on the campus is worthwhile. Even if it fails to achieve its immediate goal of student power, the movement will advance its imminent and
mediate goal of change in society generally. This is certainly preferable to
building dream castles with Paul Goodman.
The Metzger and Sanford Kadish essays should be assessed against the
preceding background. Metzger urges students and professors to unite and fight
for academic freedom. His premise-that Lehrfreiheit and Lehrnfreiheit have
an historical and functional affinity-has been argued at length in many publications2 3 and its iteration in this book does not seem to fulfill any valuable
function.
Sanford Kadish attempts to define the area within which the university
ought to regulate student conduct concerning manners and morals, including
the extent to which the university ought to apply its own sanctions to student
misconduct which also falls afoul of the criminal law. He would give the university broad powers to punish on-campus student behavior which is criminal,
even when public authorities have first taken jurisdiction. This approach is
necessarily founded upon a metaphysical notion of "appropriate" university
interest which Kadish himself cannot define and which in practice creates
rather than solves problems.
Two examples demonstrate the point. Kadish asks us to imagine that
students are "exploiting" the university's free speech facilities to plan a
civilly disobedient sitdown in front of troop trains. He says that it is "dogmatic
foolishness" to assert that this is not the university's concern, and by a blind,
unheralded leap, concludes that the university may put a stop to the planning
by imposing its own rules and sanctions.2 4 Even ignoring the lack of logical
connection with its purported premise, the last step in the reasoning is nonsensical. First, there is no reason why the university, if it uncovers a plot, cannot do what a pubkeeper would do if the plot were being hatched on his
premises: Call the cops. Second, for the university to embark upon prior restraint of speech-even speech brigaded with arguably prohibitable nonspeech
conduct-involves it in problems of rulemaking, policing, and enforcing in the
22 Credit for laying this indictment at the door of establishment seers goes to Christopher
Caudwell. C. CAUDwELL, STUDIEs IN A DYING CuLTURE xix (1938).
23
E.g., R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, THE DEVELOM2ENT oF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE
UNITED STATES 383-98 (1955).
24
FREEDOm AND ORDER 137-38.
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most difficult and sensitive area of the law. Third, as Kadish himself concedes,
the university has virtually no sanctions available between mild reprimand and
suspension or expulsion. These latter remedies are of such serious consequence
that the typical misdemeanor sentence-for trespass or disorderly conduct,
for example--is mild by comparison. Reprimand will not sate the jackals who
bay at the university's gates, and both suspension and expulsion inflict far too
much damage. Moreover, it is no doubt easier for the university to defend a
general "hands off" policy than a series of specific exercises of jurisdiction.
Finally, imposition of sanctions involves the university in conduct grossly
inappropriate to its contemporary role and function. Consider the sagacious
analysis of Professor Hans Linde in this law review a few years ago:
The intellectual model may still derive from Padua or Oxford; but when a state
like California can reasonably foresee serving one million students in public higher
education, the legal model is the social service agency and the public building complex-not the ivied embrace, at once protective and exclusive, of alma mater. The
university must be prepared to meet the student at arms length. The change is
crucial for the concept of university discipline. An ancient malcontent who throws
a brick through the window of the social security office, a group of workers staging
a sit-in for unemployment checks, a veterans' organization picketing a VA. hospital,
may each commit some punishable offense-but they do not ipso facto give the
administering agency cause to terminate their eligibility under these programs. 25

This brings me to another of Kadish's points. Referring to dope peddlers
and sexual deviants, he asserts that "the university has an interest in protecting
the whole university community against [such] dangers ...."21Then he drops
the point, just where analysis should begin. For of all the areas in which the
university's interest coincides with that of the general community, the two
he mentions are the most obvious. The community's judicial and quasi-judicial
institutions are every day deciding what to do with young defendants who
have violated narcotics laws or engaged in illegal sexual behavior. These cases
present the law with agonizing choices in two fields where emotions run high.
Moreover, we know so little about the social and personal impulses toward
narcotic use and sexually aberrant behavior that judgment is difficult. Every
lawyer who has ever represented a young person charged with a narcotics or
sex crime knows how hard it is to get the prosecutor, the police, the judge, and
the probation agency to work out a disposition tailored to the defendant's
needs rather than to the generally antediluvian views of officialdom and public
27
opinion.
Kadish now proposes that the university become a party to this process,
not as a constructive assistant toward rationality, but as another institution
to punish the defendant. The sole justification for this assumption of juris25

Linde, Campus Law: Berkeley Viewed From Eugene, 54 CAIV. L. Rxv. 40, 64 (1966).
The potency of Linde's thoughts may be attested by a recent case raising a problem he treats
tangentially, concerning a student sit-in at a draft board. Does the draft board have an
"interest" of the kind Kadish attributes to the University concerning the use of its facilities?
Certainly, but there are first amendment limits on its power to use Selective Service sanctions,
as opposed to state trespass laws, for example, to protect that interest. See Wolff v. Selective
Service Bds., 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967).
26 FpEEno' AND ORDER 139.
27 The author's bias may be shaped by his practice, which has included the defense of
young people charged with narcotics violations.
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diction is "protecting the whole university community." The members of this
community, however, in their hapless capacities as recipients of narcotics and
victims of sexual assault, are no different from members of the community at
large. There is, therefore, no justification for a university's refusal to accept
as final the verdict of criminal tribunals. If the judge thinks the defendant
should be sent away in order to protect the community, then well enough; if
he is willing, after he has used the state's considerable machinery for investigation, to take a chance and let the defendant go free, then the university
should abide by that determination. Unless, perhaps, the university can do a
better job of predicting the dangers to the community from the defendant remaining at large. I submit that even Kadish will grant that it cannot.
I have chosen only two of Kadish's numerous examples, but I think it is
not an unfair selection. On the whole, his essay is shallow and devoid of
analytical content. This is not only unfortunate but surprising, for the questions he raises are close to his wonted field of criminal law.
Indeed, in characterizing the book as a whole, "shallow" is the adjective
which most quickly springs to mind. This is regrettable because today more
than ever we need to think deeply about the role of the university in our society.
Michael E. Tigar*

THE INVEzNTION OF THE AMERICAN PoLrTICAL PARTiES. By Roy F. Nichols.

New York: The Macmillan Company. 1967. Pp. xii, 416. $8.95.
Scholars have written in great detail on the origins and evolution of the American political system. Professor Nichols now offers a new view of this subject.
Carefully avoiding the pitfalls of describing a "system," he concentrates on the
formal organization of the political parties and stresses the concept of "invention." He presents the whole continuum of American political history from the
founding of the first English colonies up through the years immediately preceding
the Civil War as a story of improvisation.
The author chooses to define a political party strictly; he will not accept as
genuine parties coalitions that gather and disperse every four years. Political
parties, he states at the outset, must function through the years that separate
major elections, and they must have a truly national appeal. When judged by his
rigorous standard, all political organizations formed prior to the early 1840's
fail to qualify as true parties. He dwells with evident relish on the period of confusion that followed the collapse of Federalism in the early years of the nineteenth century. Clearly, the rudimentary party discipline achieved by the Federalists and Democratic-Republicans in the very late 1790's had no lasting effect.
The presidential election of 1824, the last to be decided in the House of Representatives, receives the detailed treatment it deserves. Nichols presents Andrew
Jackson and Martin Van Buren as political leaders of the first order, Jackson as
the public symbol and Van Buren as the skillful builder of coalitions. The author
identifies as the first true political cadres the group of men who kept the Democratic party together after the defeat of Cass in 1848 and the Republicans who
* BA. 1962, J.D. 1966, University of California, Berkeley. Member of the District of
Columbia Bar.

